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BOOK REVIEWS
Facing Up to Scarcity: The Logic and Limits of Nonconsequentialist Thought, 
by Barbara H. Fried. Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 269. $70.00 
(hardcover).
J. L. A. DONOHUE, University of California, Los Angeles
Barbara H.  Fried’s Facing Up to Scarcity: The Logic and Limits of 
Nonconsequentialist Thought is a thought-provoking criticism of noncon-
sequentialist moral and political theories. She focuses on the problem of 
scarcity, a problem that she effectively argues has not been given nearly 
enough attention in contemporary philosophical scholarship. This thir-
teen-chapter book is divided into two major parts. The first six chapters 
argue in defense of Fried’s conclusion that nonconsequentialism is not 
equipped to handle issues of scarcity because theories based in nonag-
gregation do not bring the correct tools to the table: the problem of scar-
city requires an appeal to aggregation. In the second part, Fried turns 
to consideration of major nonconsequential political theories, including 
Rawlsian liberalism, libertarianism, and left-libertarianism and argues 
that each faces significant problems with which their proponents must 
engage if they are to stand successfully and escape what Fried calls a 
“logical dead end” (7). I will begin with a summary of the first part of 
the book as well as consideration of individual chapters and then turn to 
more critical thoughts on the book, including some praise of important 
contributions that it makes to this discussion as well as some concerns 
I have about Fried’s argument. It is important to note that though Fried 
criticizes nonconsequentialism, she does not take herself to be defending 
consequentialism: she points out that consequentialism faces its share of 
concerns, and those ought to be carefully considered as well. She does 
think, however, that her argument shows that the difficult social choices 
we face cannot be resolved without aggregation. If she is right, moral and 
political philosophers will need to turn at least some of their attention to 
the worries and problems facing aggregation.
For Fried, scarcity is a technical term, one that comes to us from eco-
nomics. It refers to “any situation in which the demand for goods exceeds 
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its supply, with the consequence that we cannot satisfy all competing 
demands for it” (7). In this sense of scarcity, practically all goods are scarce 
either because the material resources needed to produce them are finite 
or because the social opportunities to enjoy them are finite. Many of the 
tradeoffs we must make due to scarcity are suboptimal, measured by any 
normative criteria. But lines must be drawn somewhere, and the major 
conclusion of Fried’s book is that libertarians and Kantians alike cannot 
tell us how to draw those lines because the very tools they bring to the 
discussion are inadequate for the task. These theories deny that such 
tradeoffs are permissible and insist they are generally avoidable, but this 
latter claim is empirically false. They are not generally avoidable: we face 
them every day. When we drive our cars, reroof our houses, practice the 
piano in an apartment without soundproofing, we engage in activities 
that are intuitively permissible but impose (a risk of) harm on others (3). 
How can we possibly determine what level of risk imposition is permissi-
ble without aggregation? Chapters 2–6 investigate and criticize different 
nonconsequentialist theories on the basis of their inability to handle the 
problem raised by scarcity.
In Chapter 2, Fried follows Philip Tetlock in distinguishing routine, 
taboo, and tragic tradeoffs. Routine tradeoffs are between two non-sacred 
values, taboo tradeoffs between sacred and non-sacred values, and tragic 
tradeoffs between two sacred values. Fried argues that nonconsequential-
ists focus only on tragic tradeoffs and often assume that if they can solve 
those hard cases the other two categories will take care of themselves. She 
thinks that this assumption is mistaken because nonaggregative princi-
ples cannot possibly resolve “the tragic choices we actually face in life, 
in which the outcomes of available choices are all indeterminate” (24). In 
other words, Fried argues persuasively that nonconsequentialists face a 
difficulty if their normative theories are to perform a seemingly essential 
task: provide action-guiding norms in the actual world. This is because 
the actual world is one of massive epistemic uncertainty, so almost all of 
our (actual) choices are not helpfully informed by principles that depend 
on certainty. She also makes a related point that most of our activity in the 
actual world poses risk to others, and nonconsequentialists do not have 
the tools (so Fried thinks) to determine which risks are reasonable and 
which are not: aggregation is required.
Chapter 3 focuses on the duty not to harm others and in particular how 
that duty has come to be (mis)understood by use of trolleyology in moral 
philosophy. Fried identifies several problems with trolleyology, including 
problems of set-up, but her real complaint about trolleyology is that the 
moral significance of the distinction between certain and uncertain harm 






is taken as obvious when it is not obvious at all. It is clear that the distinc-
tion matters to intuitions, but Fried argues that this could be because it 
matters to psychology and emotion rather than actually making a moral 
difference. Nonconsquentialists owe an explanation and justification of 
this distinction if they want to continue to rely on it as the dividing line 
for when appeals to aggregation are and are not appropriate.
As Fried says, it is not clear that nonconsequentialism can meet this 
challenge. But I was not fully convinced by her argument because it was 
also not clear to me that nonconsequentialism cannot meet this challenge. 
For example, a Kantian might try to argue that the divide is grounded on 
the Formula of Humanity—that treating each person as an end in herself 
precisely entails treating these two kinds of epistemic situations differ-
ently. After all, when the ambulance driver is faced with the chance actu-
ally to put on the brakes to save a life, failing to do so seems quite like 
treating the pedestrian as a means. But ex ante settling on a principle that 
poses some risk to all with a chance of saving some lives doesn’t obviously 
require treating them all as a means. A Scanlonian contractualist might try 
to argue that the divide is justified based on principles that no reasonable 
person would reject: as the pedestrian in front of the ambulance driver 
ex post it is reasonable to insist that the driver stop (and reject a principle 
allowing him not to brake), but ex ante the principle that poses some risk 
to all seems reasonable. So while it is clear that Fried has raised a substan-
tial and significant challenge to the nonconsequentialist, it does not seem 
like she has succeeded in her professed goal of demonstrating that non-
consequentialism fails at the outset due to its very logic or due to failing to 
bring the right tools to the problems.
In Chapter 4, Fried takes up Scanlonian contractualism and how it han-
dles the question of uncertain harm. She argues that each of the sugges-
tions that have been proposed are unsatisfactory. Her main concern from 
Chapters 2 and 3 is echoed here: in order for nonaggregation to have a role 
here (since Scanlonian contractualists admit of space for aggregation in 
cases of uncertain risk), there must be a principled normative (not just psy-
chological or emotional) distinction between cases of certainty and uncer-
tainty. And Fried does not think such a distinction can be drawn. Either 
contractualists yield to aggregation in most cases, or they face moral grid-
lock (meaning competing claims that cannot be resolved).
Chapter 5 investigates legal scholarship focused on tortious harm. 
Fried argues that nonconsequentialists thinking about torts fail to distin-
guish two separable questions: (1) to what dangers is it permissible to 
expose others and (2) when are we required to compensate the victims 
of our risky conduct for their losses? She thinks there are cases where (1) 
and (2) come apart: that is, there are cases in which it is permissible to 
expose someone to risk and yet because of exposing them one ought to 
compensate them. Because scholars often run these questions together, 
they take themselves to have answered (1) by responding to (2), but since 
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they are importantly distinct, more work is required to provide a satisfac-
tory answer to (1).
In Chapter 6, Fried considers developments to contractualism designed 
to avoid some of the problems she raises in Chapter 4. In particular, she 
discusses “ex ante contractualism,” which measures individual harms 
by the expected harms to potential victims, calculated at the epistemic 
moment of hypothetical agreement, rather than by the actual harms to 
representative ex post losers. Fried argues that the shift to ex ante contrac-
tualism is unable to solve the problems raised by decision-making under 
uncertainty because the Greater Burden Principle (the principle dictating 
that greater harm trumps lesser harms) is limited in three important ways 
that are not mimicked in the actual world: (a) the potential claimant class 
must be closed, (b) interests of each member must be quantifiable, and (c) 
the epistemic perspective of each member must be accurately captured in 
the epistemic perspective of the “neutral” agents deciding on their behalf.
In the second half of the book, Fried turns from moral to political phi-
losophy and investigates three main versions of nonconsequentialist 
political theories: Rawslian liberalism, libertarianism, and left-libertarian-
ism. In Chapter 8, Fried argues that Rawlsian liberalism rests on a mistake. 
Namely, Rawls’s reliance on radical risk aversion in order to develop the 
maximin principle is unjustified because it is not supported by empirical 
evidence that people actually are as risk averse as Rawls assumes. Further, 
even if we were to agree with Rawls that the assumption of risk aversion 
is justified when we are comparing average utilitarianism and Justice as 
Fairness, it is not at all obvious that it is justified if we compare Justice as 
Fairness to the better-positioned competitor of sufficientarianism, since 
under sufficientarianism no one will be really poorly off (the way they 
might be under average utilitarianism, since under average utilitarianism 
the well-being of the poor figures into the calculus along with the very 
well-off). Fried’s discussion of Rawlsian liberalism continues in Chapter 
9, in which she argues that it is not as distant from libertarianism as it 
might seem. Fried contends that Rawlsian liberalism and libertarianism 
are really mostly separated by different empirical premises: if libertarians 
were proved right about the universal advantages of market economy, 
Fried thinks that the Difference Principle would require Rawls to “join in 
their endorsement of laissez-faire capitalism” (171). Chapter 10 points out 
two central problems with left libertarianism: (1) self-ownership cannot 
do the work that left-libertarians assign to it and (2) the robust interpre-
tation of the Lockean proviso that left-libertarians embrace threatens to 
eliminate the distinction between left-libertarianism and more conven-
tional strings of egalitarianism.
Chapter 11 is delightful to read, engaging in an exploration of Nozick’s 
famous Wilt Chamberlain case. Fried effectively argues that Nozick’s 
argument is unconvincing, in the main because he fails to consider the 
case where it belongs in the first place—under the principle of justice of 
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acquisition. The willingness of fans to pay Chamberlain isn’t at all relevant 
to whether Chamberlain is entitled to the wealth he has in the first place. 
We may have special reasons not to tax the possible value of someone’s 
labor (such as taxing Chamberlain based on what he could have earned 
playing basketball had he chosen not to play), but this does not show that 
the labor is not taxable once Chamberlain does choose to play or that soci-
ety is not entitled to taxing its value.
Chapter 12 and 13 focus on interesting questions about the set-up of 
arguments in political philosophy. Fried argues that the task of specifying 
and justifying the exit options when it comes to a defense of libertarian 
political principles deserves more attention that it has gotten to date and 
that it is not at all clear where a serious inquiry into the problem of exit 
options would end up (233). For this reason, many of these arguments fail 
to establish what they aim to show. Similarly, benefits tax proponents suf-
fer from implicitly assuming that a competitive market is the appropriate 
model for explicit public goods. But this assumption does not follow from 
libertarian principles, which in fact also support a progressive benefits tax.
I enjoyed the book and found it well worth reading. In particular, 
I  found myself convinced by Fried’s arguments that the particular non-
consequentialist theories she considers are unable to handle the problem 
of scarcity without appeal to aggregation. In addition, I agree with Fried 
that the problem of scarcity is a pressing one, and it is a significant con-
tribution of the book that it encourages us to take the problem of scar-
city seriously and to recognize that many of our moral theories are not 
equipped to handle it. This is significant, as Fried points out, since many 
of our everyday activities impose the risk of harm on others, and deter-
mining which of these harms are reasonable and permissible is a pressing 
societal problem, one that our moral theory ought to provide tools with 
which to engage.
But I was not convinced that Fried effectively argued for what I took to 
be an important thesis of her book—that nonconsequentialism is doomed 
to fail when it comes to articulating a viable alternative to aggregation 
in the domain of risk to harm. Fried and I  are in agreement that more 
work in trolleyology will not help us here and that the theories that we do 
have seem to fall prey to important and significant objections. But to my 
mind this shows that we need to think hard about how to handle cases 
of tradeoffs due to scarcity directly, and I remain unconvinced that non-
consequentialism might not have resources to offer. We might approach 
the problem of scarcity by thinking about problems facing aggregation, 
or we might consider and take seriously some sort of hybrid approach. 
Finally, we might try to bring to bear the resources nonconsequentialism 
does have to offer in this realm while being honest about the difficulties 
scarcity raises and whether or not our solutions are truly distinct from 
aggregation or ultimately rely on it. I remain unconvinced that nonagreg-
gation cannot help here and hope that more work will be done to take this 
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The God Who Trusts: A Relational Theology of Divine Faith, Hope, and Love, 
by Wm. Curtis Holtzen. InterVarsity Press, 2019. Pp. xv + 264. $28.00 
(paperback).
JOHANNES GRÖSSL, University of Würzburg (Germany)
In The God Who Trusts, Curtis Holtzen discusses God’s essential attributes 
from the perspective of an open and relational theology and argues for 
including trust or faith as a divine attribute. He presents his thesis right 
at the beginning: “I would like to suggest that just as holiness, love, and 
relationality are great-making qualities, so too is faith .  .  . God trusts, 
hopes, believes” (1). Holtzen defends human libertarian free will with the 
essential power to choose between alternatives. He sees such freedom as 
a requirement for a genuine loving relationship between creator and crea-
ture and for the acceptance of God’s grace (9–12). In accordance with open 
theism, he argues that human free will implies that God Himself faces an 
open future and thus is mutable and in some way in time (13–17). If God 
faces an open future, He cannot guarantee certain things to happen; there-
fore, creation involves risks.
The unquestionable strength of Holtzen’s book is a clear definition of 
terms, which is not stipulative, but rooted in ordinary-language usage. 
After giving an overview of what faith means and entails (chapter 2), the 
book is structured around particular terms that are to be attributed to God: 
love (chapter 3), belief (chapter 4), trust (chapter 5), hope (chapter 6). In 
a final chapter entitled “Divine Faith and the Advent of Christ,” Holtzen 
makes a quite novel excursus on Christology, on which I will specifically 
focus in this review.
problem seriously and see what nonconsequentialist theories might offer 
by way of solution.
It seems to me that Christian philosophers or philosophers of religion 
who are interested in religious moral theory will have much to gain from 
consideration of Fried’s book: the problems she raises are problems facing 
all of us in a modern society in which the problems of scarcity and risk 
imposition are central. It will not be open to most of us to accept aggrega-
tion full-stop as the solution to these problems, so we will need to think 
hard about how nonconsequentialism, including in Christian moral the-
ory, can address them.
